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Identity, Social Hierarchy, and Labor-Market Institutions

Learning Objectives

By the end of Week 6, students should be able to:

  1. explain when a social category becomes a labor-market institution;

  2. distinguish category-based hierarchy from Week 5 norms of conduct;

  3. map hierarchy into employer beliefs, networks, credential recognition, occupation boundaries, public rules, local governance, contact institutions, and spatial sorting;

  4. evaluate audit studies, resume experiments, network and migration designs, historical or public-rule shocks, contact experiments, and macro misallocation frameworks;

  5. connect micro barriers to broader labor allocation, occupational persistence, and intergroup inequality.

Opening Orientation

Week 6 asks how caste, race, ethnicity, gender, religion, migrant status, and related categories become durable systems for allocating work, authority, protection, and mobility. The economic question is not whether identity matters in the abstract. It is when a category changes access to jobs, networks, credentials, occupations, public employment, protection, and local labor-market governance.

A social category becomes a labor-market institution when it is embedded in repeated rules or practices that workers and firms must anticipate. A name on a resume can change callback probabilities. A caste or ethnic network can insure workers while steering them into persistent occupations. A foreign credential can be discounted before productivity is observed. Public agencies can segregate workers directly. Local governance can determine who is protected, who can commute safely, and who can bargain without retaliation. These are institutional margins because they structure labor allocation, not merely because they express prejudice.

Week 5 studied norms of conduct: what work is acceptable, how households view market work, when search or competition is legitimate, and how communities discipline wage acceptance. Week 6 studies durable hierarchy: category-based access, exclusion, authority, protection, and occupational boundaries. Norms can be part of hierarchy, but the object now is structural position.

Bridge

The transition from Week 5 to Week 6 is a change in mechanism. A conduct norm tells workers which actions are socially rewarded or punished: working after childbirth, applying to a competitive job, migrating away from family, socializing with managers, or accepting a low wage. A hierarchy tells workers and firms how category membership changes access: whose resume is trusted, whose network is useful, whose credential is recognized, whose job is protected, whose neighborhood is connected, and whose authority is legitimate.

The two can interact. Gender-role norms can become gender hierarchy when they harden into occupation boundaries, promotion barriers, or unequal authority. Religion can be a conduct norm when the mechanism is reputation-preserving behavior, and a hierarchy when the mechanism is exclusion, legal status, or public protection. Migrant status can involve norms about belonging, but it becomes a labor-market institution when legal status, credential recognition, name or accent signals, and employer screening change occupational matching.

The Week 6 discipline is therefore to start from a category, name the institutional channel, and identify the labor margin. Bertrand and Mullainathan identify differential treatment in first-stage hiring through randomized names on resumes Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004. Oreopoulos uses resume variation to study skilled immigrants, credential recognition, and employer responses to foreign backgrounds Oreopoulos, 2011. Munshi and Rosenzweig show how caste networks shape schooling, occupations, and mobility Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2006. Hsieh, Hurst, Jones, and Klenow quantify how barriers to occupational access for women and Black workers reduced aggregate talent allocation in the United States Hsieh et al., 2019. Lowe studies whether different forms of caste contact change social distance and cooperation Lowe, 2021. Aneja and Xu study public-sector employment segregation under Woodrow Wilson as state action that changed Black workers’ labor-market outcomes Aneja & Xu, 2020. Darity’s stratification economics frame keeps the central point visible: intergroup inequality is actively reproduced through position, power, and assets, not only through individual traits Darity, 2022.

A compact access map is:

P(accessij)=f(xi,qi,Bj,Ni,Li,Hi),P(\text{access}_{ij}) = f(x_i, q_i, B_j, N_i, L_i, H_i),

where ii is a worker, jj is a job or institutional gate, xix_i is observed human capital, qiq_i is job-relevant quality that may be imperfectly observed, BjB_j summarizes employer beliefs or screening rules, NiN_i is network access, LiL_i is legal or public-rule status, and HiH_i is category-based hierarchy. Equation (1) is not a full structural model. It is a map for asking whether observed gaps remain after prices and skills are named, and which institutional channel is doing the work.

Category and hierarchy map

Social categoryWhat makes it a labor-market institution?Main labor marginsRepresentative papers
Raceemployer beliefs, segregation, public rules, residential sortingcallbacks, hiring, occupation access, public employmentBertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Aneja & Xu, 2020; Hsieh et al., 2019
Castenetwork closure, occupation boundaries, social insurance, contact institutionsschooling choice, occupation persistence, mobility, collaborationMunshi & Rosenzweig, 2006; Lowe, 2021
Migrant statuscredential recognition, name/accent screening, legal status, information barrierscallbacks, occupational downgrading, wage loss, mobilityOreopoulos, 2011
Gender as hierarchyrestricted access to occupations and leadership, not just role expectationsoccupational access, promotions, talent allocationHsieh et al., 2019
Ethnicity / religionnetwork closure, local governance, group protection or exclusionreferrals, local access, hiring, promotionDarity, 2022

Field Core

When Categories Become Institutions

Not every identity marker is an institution. A category becomes institutional when it is linked to durable allocation rules, repeated expectations, or public and private practices that govern labor-market access. The test is behavioral and organizational: would two workers with similar productivity-relevant characteristics face different hiring, promotion, network, credential, occupational, mobility, or protection margins because of category membership?

This test keeps Week 6 from becoming a generic identity lecture. The unit is not identity as self-understanding. It is category membership as a mechanism in labor exchange. Race enters when it changes callbacks, public employment, residential access, or occupational mobility. Caste enters when it organizes networks, schooling choices, social insurance, occupations, and contact. Migrant status enters when it changes credential recognition, legal exposure, employer screening, and occupational downgrading. Gender enters as hierarchy when it restricts access to occupations, authority, and talent allocation, not only when it changes role expectations. Religion and ethnicity enter when they structure local governance, protection, networks, or exclusion.

The same observed wage gap can be generated by different objects: skill, labor supply, preferences, employer beliefs, referral networks, public rules, legal status, local segregation, or historical barriers. Week 6 therefore asks students to decompose the gap into mechanisms before naming the category. The category matters because institutions make it predictive of access.

Institutional channels map

ChannelHow hierarchy operatesLabor-market outcomesDistinct from Week 5?
Employer beliefs and screeningemployers differentially interpret names, credentials, accents, or category markerscallbacks, hiring, job access, wagesYes: this is access, not acceptable conduct
Networks and referralsgroup institutions channel information and insurance unevenlyoccupation choice, migration, mobility, hiringYes
Credential recognition and occupation boundariessome groups’ skills or credentials are discounted or blockedoccupational downgrading, promotion barriers, underemploymentYes
Public rules and state actionlaw and government organizations reproduce or mitigate hierarchypublic jobs, enforcement, protection, segregationYes
Local governance and spatial sortingplace and local authority structure who can access jobs or protectioncommuting, local hiring, safety, mobilityYes
Contact and integration institutionsthe nature of interaction can reinforce or weaken hierarchycollaboration, team productivity, intergroup accessMostly Week 6

Employer Beliefs And Differential Treatment

Employer beliefs become institutional when screening rules repeatedly translate category signals into access probabilities. Resume names, accents, foreign credentials, addresses, employment histories, and school names can be used as signals before productivity is observed. Differential treatment at this stage changes the probability of reaching an interview, receiving a job offer, or entering a career ladder.

Bertrand and Mullainathan are the central audit-study anchor because the design randomizes racially distinctive names on otherwise similar resumes and measures employer callbacks Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004. The strength of the design is precision about first-stage differential treatment. It identifies whether employer responses differ when the category signal changes while resume content is held fixed. It does not identify the entire lifecycle effect of race on wages, promotions, effort, schooling, networks, or occupational allocation. It also does not by itself separate taste-based discrimination, statistical discrimination, customer discrimination, or institutional screening routines. The design identifies the access margin.

Oreopoulos extends this logic to skilled immigrants and credential recognition Oreopoulos, 2011. In that setting, foreign names, foreign experience, language cues, and credential location can affect callbacks even among workers who appear skilled on paper. The institutional object is not simply “immigrant identity.” It is how employers interpret foreign human capital and background signals. The labor margin is occupational matching: skilled workers can be screened out of jobs that match their training, pushed into downgrading, or forced to acquire local credentials to make productivity legible.

The bridge to Week 5 is useful here. A conduct-norm account would ask whether workers view a job as acceptable. A hierarchy account asks whether employers view the worker as acceptable for the job. The empirical design must make clear whose margin is moving.

Networks, Referrals, And Occupation Persistence

Networks are productive institutions. They transmit information, insure risk, screen workers, enforce obligations, and help employers find labor. They can also reproduce hierarchy when network membership is category-based and access to high-return opportunities depends on closed referrals.

Munshi and Rosenzweig provide the core caste-network example Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2006. Caste networks can support workers through social insurance and job information, but they can also generate persistence in schooling and occupational choices. The key labor insight is not that caste is “culture.” It is that caste is an organizational system. It changes the returns to leaving traditional networks, the risks of occupational mobility, the credibility of referrals, and the information available to workers and employers.

Network designs are strongest when they observe group-linked transitions, schooling choices, migration, referrals, or occupation persistence in ways that connect social organization to labor outcomes. They do not automatically prove exclusion. A network can be efficient if it solves information and enforcement problems. It becomes hierarchy when the benefits and costs of network access are systematically category-ranked, when outsiders cannot enter valuable referral chains, or when network insurance makes exit from low-return occupations costly.

This is why migration evidence belongs in the Week 6 toolkit. Migrants often rely on origin, caste, ethnicity, religion, or family networks to find jobs and housing. The same networks can lower moving costs while concentrating workers in segmented occupations. A good design asks whether the network changes the feasible job set, not only whether migrants earn different wages.

Credential Recognition And Occupational Boundaries

Credential recognition is one of the clearest ways hierarchy becomes labor-market structure. A worker’s training can have high productive value but low market value if employers, licensing bodies, public agencies, or clients discount the credential because of origin, race, gender, caste, school, language, or legal status. The result is underemployment and occupational downgrading.

Oreopoulos is again central because the resume experiment can be read as evidence on employer interpretation of foreign credentials and experience, not only on immigrant names Oreopoulos, 2011. The design asks whether changing visible background and credential information changes callbacks. It does not directly measure actual productivity, licensing rules, or long-run adaptation, so the interpretation should stay at the screening margin unless linked to additional evidence.

Occupation boundaries create a broader allocation problem. If groups are excluded from high-return occupations, management, professions, public employment, or authority roles, individual losses aggregate into macro losses. Hsieh, Hurst, Jones, and Klenow quantify how declining barriers for women and Black workers contributed to U.S. growth by improving the allocation of talent across occupations Hsieh et al., 2019. Their framework is not an audit study. It asks what aggregate output is lost when barriers prevent workers from entering occupations where their talent would be most productive.

A compact loss object is:

Y=Y∗(1−μH),Y = Y^*(1 - \mu_H),

where Y∗Y^* is output under a less distorted allocation of talent and μH\mu_H summarizes the output share lost because hierarchy restricts occupational access. This object helps students connect micro barriers to macro allocation without pretending that audit estimates mechanically scale into aggregate losses. The bridge requires assumptions about equilibrium, occupations, human-capital investment, labor demand, and selection.

Public Rules, State Action, And Local Governance

Hierarchy is not only a private-employer problem. Public rules and public organizations can create labor-market hierarchy directly through legal status, segregated employment, unequal enforcement, licensing, public-sector hiring, school assignment, residential rules, policing, and administrative access.

Aneja and Xu make the state visible as an employer and rule-maker by studying employment segregation in the federal government under Woodrow Wilson Aneja & Xu, 2020. The institutional object is not an informal preference alone. It is public-sector reorganization that changed Black workers’ employment, job ladders, and earnings opportunities. Historical and public-rule shocks are useful because they can identify the effect of institutional changes that alter category-based access at scale.

These designs also clarify what is not identified. A public-rule shock can estimate the effect of a rule or administrative reorganization on employment outcomes. It does not automatically identify all private-market spillovers, the full welfare effect, or the long-run persistence mechanism. Students should ask whether the rule changes hiring, promotion, separation, wages, occupational assignment, public protection, or local bargaining power.

Local governance matters because many labor institutions are implemented locally. Enforcement discretion, licensing offices, school boards, police, municipal hiring, housing rules, transportation, and informal political authority affect who can reach jobs and who is protected once employed. Spatial sorting is part of this system. Residential segregation or migrant settlement patterns can separate workers from jobs, weaken network access to high-return firms, increase commuting costs, and expose workers to unequal enforcement.

Contact And Integration As Institutional Margins

Contact is not just an attitude treatment. In labor markets, contact is an institutional design problem: who works with whom, under what task structure, with what authority, incentives, monitoring, and repeated interaction?

Lowe’s field experiment on caste integration shows why the type of contact matters Lowe, 2021. Collaborative and adversarial contact can have different effects on social distance and intergroup behavior. The labor-market implication is that integration is not equivalent to proximity. A workplace, training program, apprenticeship, team, or public works project can reduce or reinforce hierarchy depending on whether interaction creates cooperation, competition, status threat, or exclusion.

Contact experiments identify the effect of a designed interaction on measured attitudes, behavior, or cooperation in a particular setting. They do not by themselves identify hiring discrimination, credential recognition, long-run occupational mobility, or macro allocation. Their value for Week 6 is to show that institutions can change the way category boundaries operate in repeated labor-market interaction.

Stratification, Persistence, And Intergroup Inequality

Hierarchy persists because access gaps feed on one another. Employer beliefs reduce entry, which changes experience. Network closure affects schooling and referrals, which changes occupational histories. Credential discounting creates local work experience gaps, which employers later treat as productivity signals. Public rules shape where people work and live, which changes networks and schools. Spatial sorting changes exposure to firms and protection. Each channel can transform past hierarchy into current evidence that appears category-neutral.

Darity’s stratification economics framework keeps the course from reducing inequality to individual endowments or one-shot discrimination Darity, 2022. Position and possessions matter because group hierarchy is reproduced across assets, labor markets, institutions, and social power. In a labor course, the takeaway is specific: students should study how labor-market institutions turn category position into access, bargaining power, job quality, and mobility.

This persistence logic also prevents a common mistake. The absence of a formal exclusion rule today does not imply the absence of hierarchy. Durable hierarchy may remain in beliefs, referrals, credential systems, residential patterns, occupational boundaries, public employment histories, and local governance.

Frontier Questions

Frontier research needs to connect levels of evidence. An audit study can show a hiring gate. A network design can show persistent channels of information and insurance. A public-rule shock can show state action. A contact experiment can show how institutional design changes intergroup behavior. A macro framework can show how barriers affect aggregate output. The hard question is how to link these without overclaiming.

First, how should economists connect micro discrimination to macro misallocation? A callback gap is not an output loss by itself. It becomes an allocation loss when it changes occupation choice, investment, experience, promotion, or matching at scale.

Second, how do legal status and credential recognition interact with labor demand? Migrant workers may face employer beliefs, licensing barriers, visa constraints, language screening, and spatial sorting at once. A credible design should name which gate is being studied.

Third, which institutions weaken hierarchy and which merely move it? Anti-discrimination law, public employment, integration programs, credential reforms, and local enforcement can reduce one barrier while leaving networks, housing, or occupation boundaries intact.

Fourth, how do local governments reproduce or mitigate labor-market hierarchy? Local implementation can determine who receives protection, which firms comply, where public jobs are located, and whose complaints are credible.

Fifth, how can researchers distinguish Week 5 conduct norms from Week 6 hierarchy? The diagnostic question is whether the mechanism is a social cost attached to an action or a category-based structure of access.

Frontier and reading map

Frontier themeWhy it matters for labor economicsGood starting papersOpen questions
From micro discrimination to macro misallocationlabor economists increasingly connect hiring barriers to aggregate lossesBertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Hsieh et al., 2019how do we link audit evidence to equilibrium allocation?
Migrant status as institutional hierarchymigrant legal/credential status shapes occupational matching and protectionOreopoulos, 2011how much hierarchy comes from legal status vs beliefs?
Hierarchy in public employment and governancethe state can reproduce labor-market exclusion directlyAneja & Xu, 2020when does public employment mitigate vs entrench hierarchy?
Networks and mobility trapssocial closure can insure workers while restricting occupational changeMunshi & Rosenzweig, 2006when are networks efficient and when are they exclusionary?
Integration and institutional designcontact institutions can alter social distance and labor-market interactionLowe, 2021which forms of workplace contact reduce hierarchy durably?
Boundary with Week 5Week 5 studies conduct norms; Week 6 studies durable category-based exclusion—how should researchers distinguish norms from hierarchy empirically?

Research Lab

The Week 6 lab is built around Reproduce -> Diagnose -> Transfer. It runs locally with deterministic synthetic data and does not require confidential audit-study applications, immigration resumes, caste-network microdata, contact-experiment data, public personnel records, or structural-estimation inputs.

Reproduce. The primary anchor is Bertrand and Mullainathan Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004. Students use a synthetic resume-audit file with randomized name signals, resume quality, neighborhood signals, occupation type, employer sector, and callbacks. They reproduce the core audit logic by comparing callback rates across category signals while holding resume quality visible in the table. The secondary challenge anchor is Oreopoulos Oreopoulos, 2011, which shifts the interpretation from race-name signals to foreign credentials, immigrant status, and occupational matching.

Diagnose. Students then classify barriers as belief-based, network-based, credential-based, legal or public-rule-based, contact-based, spatial, or macro allocation barriers. The diagnostic table asks three questions: Is the evidence micro, meso, or macro? Is the first moving margin employer screening, referral access, credential recognition, public employment, local protection, contact, or occupation allocation? Does the mechanism belong to Week 5 conduct norms or Week 6 hierarchy?

Transfer. The transfer exercise maps designs to the paper set. Munshi and Rosenzweig anchor the network and caste extension Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2006. Lowe anchors the contact and integration extension Lowe, 2021. Aneja and Xu anchor the public-rule extension Aneja & Xu, 2020. Hsieh, Hurst, Jones, and Klenow anchor the misallocation extension Hsieh et al., 2019. Darity anchors the stratification synthesis Darity, 2022.

The bounded pedagogical path asks students to produce three objects:

  1. a resume-audit callback table separating category signals from resume quality;

  2. a barrier diagnostic table naming whether evidence is belief-based, network-based, legal, credential, contact, spatial, or macro;

  3. a transfer classification table that states what each design identifies and what it does not identify.

The lab lives at labs/06-identity-social-hierarchy-and-labor-market-institutions/. The smoke test builds synthetic data, writes reproduction outputs, runs the barrier diagnostic, classifies transfer designs, and produces short notes for seminar discussion.

Methods Box

Audit studies randomize category signals in interactions with employers, landlords, clients, or institutions. They are strongest for differential treatment at a specified gate, such as a callback or invitation. They do not identify all downstream wages, human-capital investment, networks, or equilibrium effects.

Credential and resume experiments randomize or vary names, foreign credentials, local experience, language cues, and other resume features. They identify how screeners value visible signals. They are especially useful for employer beliefs and credential recognition, but they do not directly observe true productivity or long-run job performance.

Network and migration designs study how group-based networks, origin ties, caste, ethnicity, or migrant communities affect schooling, job search, referrals, mobility, and occupation persistence. They are strongest for meso-level allocation mechanisms. They must distinguish useful information and insurance from exclusionary closure.

Historical and public-rule shocks use institutional changes, administrative reforms, segregation rules, legal status changes, or state action to study category-based labor allocation. They identify the effect of a rule or public organization on observed labor outcomes. They may not identify private-market spillovers or persistence without additional evidence.

Contact experiments randomize or structure cross-group interaction. They identify whether a specific form of contact changes behavior, cooperation, prejudice, or integration. They do not by themselves identify all labor-market access barriers.

Macro or structural misallocation frameworks quantify output or growth losses from barriers to occupational choice and talent allocation. They connect hierarchy to aggregate labor allocation. Their estimates depend on modeling assumptions about talent distributions, barriers, selection, and equilibrium wages.

Identification and evidence map

Empirical settingMain objectTypical designWhat it identifies bestRepresentative papers
Resume / audit studyemployer beliefs and screeningrandomized names, credentials, or background markersdifferential treatment at first stage of hiringBertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Oreopoulos, 2011
Network / caste settingsocial closure and occupation persistencelinked group/community outcomes or group-specific transitionsrole of networks and traditional institutionsMunshi & Rosenzweig, 2006
Contact experimentreducibility of hierarchy through institutional interactionrandomized collaborative vs adversarial contacthow organizational design changes prejudice or integrationLowe, 2021
Historical/public-rule shockhierarchy through state actionpolicy change or institutional reorganizationimpact of segregation or legal hierarchy in public employmentAneja & Xu, 2020
Aggregate allocation frameworkmacro cost of barriersstructural or accounting decompositiontalent misallocation from group-based barriersHsieh et al., 2019
Stratification frameworkpersistence across domainssynthesis / conceptual frameworkhow intergroup inequality is actively reproducedDarity, 2022

Reading Ladder And References

Employer beliefs and first-stage hiring. Start with Bertrand and Mullainathan for the canonical resume audit design Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004. Then read Oreopoulos for skilled immigrants, foreign credentials, and screening Oreopoulos, 2011.

Networks and occupation persistence. Read Munshi and Rosenzweig for caste networks, schooling, occupation choice, and the tradeoff between insurance and mobility Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2006.

Occupational boundaries and misallocation. Read Hsieh, Hurst, Jones, and Klenow for the macro allocation cost of barriers by race and gender Hsieh et al., 2019.

Public rules and state action. Read Aneja and Xu for federal employment segregation as an institutional shock to labor-market hierarchy Aneja & Xu, 2020.

Contact and integration. Read Lowe for the distinction between collaborative and adversarial contact under caste hierarchy Lowe, 2021.

Stratification frame. Read Darity for a broader framework connecting position, possessions, and intergroup inequality Darity, 2022.

Exercises And Discussion Prompts

  1. Choose a labor-market gap involving race, caste, ethnicity, gender, religion, or migrant status. Name one skill explanation, one conduct-norm explanation, and one hierarchy explanation. What evidence would separate them?

  2. In a resume audit, what does a callback gap identify? What important labor-market outcomes does it not identify?

  3. Use equation (1) to classify a migrant credential-recognition barrier. Which terms move first?

  4. Explain when a referral network is an efficiency-enhancing institution and when it becomes hierarchy.

  5. Use equation (2) to describe how occupation barriers can create aggregate output losses. What assumptions are needed to move from micro evidence to macro loss?

  6. Design a contact intervention that could reduce workplace hierarchy. What form of contact would you randomize, and what labor outcome would you measure?

Reproducibility And Code Lab Note

The Week 6 code lab is a synthetic teaching analog. It does not reproduce confidential resume-audit files, immigration application data, caste-network microdata, contact-experiment records, public personnel files, or structural estimation inputs. Its purpose is to help students practice the diagnostic sequence for hierarchy: identify the gate, name the institutional channel, distinguish micro, meso, and macro evidence, and separate Week 5 conduct norms from Week 6 category-based hierarchy.

Slide Companion Note

The Week 6 slide deck lives at slides/week6/06-identity-social-hierarchy-and-labor-market-institutions.tex. The deck defines the central question, marks the Week 5 to Week 6 boundary, explains when social categories become labor-market institutions, covers employer beliefs, networks, occupation boundaries, public rules, contact, identification strategies, frontier questions, and the bridge to Week 7.

Bridge Forward

Week 6 has studied hierarchy as a current allocation system: beliefs, networks, credentials, occupations, public rules, local governance, spatial sorting, and contact institutions. Week 7 asks why past institutions continue to shape modern labor markets after the original rules have changed. The connecting question is persistence: when a hierarchy changes schooling, occupations, assets, places, networks, or public employment, those channels can survive the formal rule that first created them.

References
  1. Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination. American Economic Review, 94(4), 991–1013. 10.1257/0002828042002561
  2. Oreopoulos, P. (2011). Why Do Skilled Immigrants Struggle in the Labor Market? A Field Experiment with Thirteen Thousand Resumes. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 3(4), 148–171. 10.1257/pol.3.4.148
  3. Munshi, K., & Rosenzweig, M. (2006). Traditional Institutions Meet the Modern World: Caste, Gender, and Schooling Choice in a Globalizing Economy. American Economic Review, 96(4), 1225–1252. 10.1257/aer.96.4.1225
  4. Hsieh, C.-T., Hurst, E., Jones, C. I., & Klenow, P. J. (2019). The Allocation of Talent and U.S. Economic Growth. Econometrica, 87(5), 1439–1474. 10.3982/ECTA11427
  5. Lowe, M. (2021). Types of Contact: A Field Experiment on Collaborative and Adversarial Caste Integration. American Economic Review, 111(6), 1807–1844. 10.1257/aer.20191780
  6. Aneja, A., & Xu, G. (2020). The Costs of Employment Segregation: Evidence from the Federal Government under Woodrow Wilson (Working Paper No. 27798). National Bureau of Economic Research.
  7. Darity, W. A. Jr. (2022). Position and Possessions: Stratification Economics and Intergroup Inequality. Journal of Economic Literature, 60(2), 400–426. 10.1257/jel.20211690